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  On Sporting Integrity 
Abstract 
It has become increasingly popular for sports fans, pundits, coaches and players to 
appeal to ideas of ‘sporting integrity’ when voicing their approval or disapproval of 
some aspect of the sporting world. My goal in this paper will be to examine whether 
there is any way to understand this idea in a way that both makes sense of the way in 
which it is used and presents a distinctly ‘sporting’ form of integrity. I will look at three 
recent high profile sporting incidents that caused sporting integrity to be called into 
question. I will then examine three different ways in which philosophers have sought 
to understand integrity and examine whether any of these accounts can provide us 
with a plausible account of sporting integrity. I will argue that such an account can be 
given and show how this helps us to understand the three cases.   
Introduction 
Integrity is the most fundamental value to sport. Without integrity competition 
is meaningless. 1 
 
It has become increasingly popular for sports fans, journalists, coaches and players to 
appeal to ideas of ‘sporting integrity’ when voicing their approval or disapproval of 
some aspect of the sporting world. In recent years there appears to have been a 
marked increase in discussion surrounding sporting integrity. High profile cases of 
breakdowns in sporting integrity, such as that involving the cyclist Lance Armstrong, 
appear to have raised the profile of sporting integrity. Moreover, institutional 
safeguards for sporting integrity appear to be on the rise. In 2010 The International 
Centre for Sporting Security was established with the aim, “to improve security, safety 
                                                
1 (ICSS 2014). 
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and integrity in sport.2 Meanwhile, INTERPOL has launched its own ‘Integrity in 
Sport’ programme.3 
 
It is far from clear, however, that there is a shared understanding of what this term 
means. As Cleret et al. point out, “there is still a lack of clarity and convergence as to 
its meaning and the scope of its application.”4 Is it supposed to refer to a distinct 
sporting form of integrity? Does it refer to one kind of integrity or are there different 
forms of sporting integrity? Even if we had answers to these questions we would not 
have a full answer to what ‘sporting integrity’ is, as philosophers disagree on how 
‘integrity’ itself should be understood. In this paper I will examine how we should 
understand the nature of sporting integrity.  
 
The discussion will proceed as follows, I will start, in §1, by explaining what we should 
look for in an account of sporting integrity. I will then, in §2, explore a range of 
different options that are available to those seeking to give an account of sporting 
integrity. I will then, in §3, look at three examples where sporting integrity has been 
said either to be threatened or to break down. I will then, in §4 and §5, use lessons 
drawn from these examples to provide an account of sporting integrity and explain 
why it is preferable to the alternative options. I will finish by examining and 
responding to an objection that could be raised against this argument.  
 
1. Three Desiderata 
 
                                                
2 (ICSS 2010) 
3 (INTERPOL 2014) 
4 (2015 p.2) 
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In this section I will explain three desiderata that a plausible account of sporting 
integrity should satisfy.  
 
First, a definition of sporting integrity that is roughly in line with ordinary usage is to 
be preferred to one that is not. While this is a defeasible consideration we should 
prefer an account that does not attribute error to ordinary speakers over one that 
does.  I will call this point: Respect Ordinary Use.5 
 
Second, a plausible account of integrity should provide us with resources for 
explaining the importance that people place on maintaining sporting integrity. This 
point is related to the previous one. As we have seen already and will see again in 
Section 3, sporting integrity is frequently claimed to be a fundamental value for sport. 
An account that is able to do justice to this thought is, all else being equal, preferable 
to one that is not. I will call this point: Justify Importance. 
 
Finally, an acceptable definition of ‘sporting integrity’ will be one that fits with how 
the term is used in non-sporting contexts. It would, after all, be surprising if there were 
no relation between the way in which integrity is used in sporting contexts and the 
way it is used in other contexts. At the very least, any account that is unable to show 
how the term fits with other uses of the term should be capable of offering a good 
                                                
5 We might worry that given that sporting integrity is a relatively new term that we 
should not put too much weight on respecting ordinary use. However, even though 
this term is relatively new I think that, all else being equal, we should still prefer an 
account that respects ordinary use to one that does not. After all, what we are trying 
to do in giving an analysis of this phrase is to try to provide a fuller understanding of a 
phrase that appears in non-philosophical sporting discussions. Of course, this is just 
one desideratum and there are other desiderata that should also play an important 
role in deciding between competing accounts of sporting integrity. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for raising this worry. 
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explanation as to why the meaning of ‘sporting integrity’ does not fit with how the 
word ‘integrity’ is used in other contexts. I will call this point: Explain the Connection. 
2. The Options 
 
Before I investigate how to apply the concept of integrity to sport it is worth 
considering what, in general, is meant by ‘integrity’. The term ‘integrity’ stems from 
the Latin adjective ‘integer’, which means ‘wholeness’ or ‘completeness’. However, 
clearly this is far from a full account of what we mean by integrity. There are two key 
questions we must answer in order to provide a full account of sporting integrity. First 
we must say who it is that possesses sporting integrity. Then we must say what 
sporting integrity is.6 In this section I will provide a brief overview of the literature on 
integrity in order to look at a range of different ways in which we could understand 
sporting integrity. I will then draw on these different accounts in Sections 4 and 5 
when I investigate what the most plausible account of sporting integrity is.  
 
The majority of philosophers working on the concept of integrity are interested in 
integrity as a personal moral virtue. There are three different types of account that 
have been proposed. The first is the view of integrity as coherence. On this view 
integrity is a relation of coherence between different parts of a person. To possess 
integrity is to possess an undivided and coherent self. One version of this view is 
                                                
6 We might worry that we cannot answer the first question without already having an 
answer to the second. There is some truth in this worry. We certainly could not give a 
conclusive answer to the first question if we had no idea how to answer the second. 
However, I think we can ask the first question as a way of starting to think about an 
answer to the second. However, this initial inquiry is going to be tentative, if our 
account of the possessor of sporting integrity leaves us unable to provide a plausible 
account of what sporting integrity consists of, then this will give us reason to 
reconsider our account of the possessor of sporting integrity. Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for raising this worry. 
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defended by John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter.7 They define integrity as strength of 
will. This, in turn is defined as the ability to ensure our first-order desires (ordinary 
desires such as the desire to eat a snack) are in conformity with our second-order 
desires (desires regarding our own desires such as a desire to not desire a snack). To 
have integrity on this account is to have the capacity to exercise strength of will in a 
sufficiently wide range of situations.8 Another popular view of is that of integrity as 
practical identity. On this view integrity is understood in terms of possessing a 
character that is founded on identity-conferring commitments.9 For example, a 
committed pacifist whose identity is intimately bound up with this commitment and 
who stays true to it can be said to possess integrity. A third view of integrity is as a 
social view.10 On this view integrity involves standing for something in front of one’s 
fellow deliberators. A person with integrity is someone willing to stand by her best 
judgement in the face of social pressure. All three accounts might be supplemented in 
various ways. Lynne Mcfall argues that to possess integrity an agent’s beliefs must be 
reasonable.11 Likewise, Elizabeth Ashford argues that an agent can only possess 
integrity if her commitments are objectively correct.12  
One answer that could be given to the question of who possesses sporting integrity is 
that sporting integrity is a personal virtue possessed by those involved in sport. I will 
call this option ‘Sporting Integrity as Personal Integrity’. Of course if it is decided that 
sporting integrity is a personal virtue then this will only be the first step towards giving 
                                                
7 (2007) 
8 For objections to the coherence account of integrity see Calhoun (1995) and McFall 
(1987). 
9 This view of integrity is defended by Williams (1973; 1981). 
10 Versions of this view of integrity are defended by Calhoun (1995) and Scherkoske 
(2013). 
11 (1987 p. 11). 
12 (2000 p. 424). 
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an account. Such an account would also have to provide an answer to the question of 
what sporting integrity is.13  
 
Integrity is also claimed to be a virtue that can be possessed by institutions. Ronald 
Dworkin has claimed that in addition to the commonly accepted political values of 
fairness and justice, political institutions should also possess integrity. This value 
applied to political institutions: 
 
Requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and 
coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone the same 
substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some.14 
Dworkin takes personal integrity to involve acting in line with convictions that inform 
and shape ones life. Similarly, political integrity involves a state acting in line with a 
coherent set of principles.15 This value creates two demands on political institutions. 
First, those creating new laws should seek to do so in a way that keeps the set of laws 
coherent. Second, those enforcing the law should treat the law as “expressing and 
respecting a coherent set of principles.”16 
 
Another option then for those investigating the nature of sporting integrity is that 
sporting integrity is a virtue of sporting institutions. I will call this account ‘Sporting 
Integrity as Institutional Integrity’. This account would have to provide an answer to 
                                                
13 We might think that it is particularly incumbent on such a view to provide an 
explanation of the relationship between sporting integrity and other sporting virtues 
such as sportsmanship. For a discussion of the concept of sportsmanship see Abad 
(2010) and Feezell (1986). 
 
14  (1986 p.165).  
15 (1986 p.166). 
16 (1986 p.217). 
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the second question of what sporting integrity is. At this stage of laying out all of the 
available options it seems reasonable to think that the three ways in which personal 
integrity is accounted for could also provide three ways in which we could explain the 
nature of institutional integrity.  
 
While these two sets of options leave open a range of further choices, it could also be 
thought that they provide an exhaustive range of the possible possessors of sporting 
integrity. However, interesting work on the notion of the epistemic integrity of the 
scientific research process points towards a further option. In De Winter and 
Kosolosky’s work on scientific integrity, for example, they give an account of what it is 
for a research process, rather than the people or institutions conducting that research, 
to have epistemic integrity.17. It is also worth noting that ordinary usage of the term is 
applied far more widely than simply to people or institutions. It is also applied, for 
example, to buildings, novels and ecosystems.18 For our purposes the lesson to take 
from this is that we should be open-minded in our search for the relevant possessor of 
sporting integrity. But if it isn’t sports people or sporting institutions that possess 
sporting integrity then what could it be? One answer is that it is the sport itself that 
possesses integrity. I will call this account ‘Sporting Integrity as a Virtue of Sport’. 
This account must also provide answers to the question of what sporting integrity is 
and again at this stage it seems reasonable to work on the assumption that the three 
possible ways of account for personal integrity can provide three options here as well.   
 
In this section I have presented three answers to each of the two questions about 
sporting integrity. The following chart summarizes the range of possible options 
                                                
17 (2013) 
18 Miller (2013: 1) makes this point. 




 Personal Virtue Institutional Virtue Virtue of Sports 
Coherence Account Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Practical Identity 
Account 
Option 4 Option 5 Option 6 
Social View 
 
Option 7 Option 8 Option 9 
 
As we can see there are nine possible options here. Before deciding which of these 
offers the best account of sporting integrity I must examine how this phrase is used. It 
is this task to which I will now turn. 
 
3. Breakdowns of Sporting Integrity 
Sporting integrity appears to be a value that is rarely commented upon unless it is 
seen to be absent. In order then to get a clear idea of what we might mean by the 
phrase we should look to cases where people have claim that sporting integrity has 
been damaged. In this section I will present three cases where sporting integrity has 
been said to break down.  
 
A. Lance Armstrong 
 
In January 2013 the seven-times winner of cycling’s Tour-de-France admitted to the 
use of performance enhancing drugs in each of these victories, a claim he had denied 
for years. According to the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), the US 
Postal Service Procyclying team, of which Armstrong was the most prominent 
member, “ran the most sophisticated, professionalized and successful doping program 
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that sport has ever seen.”19 Unsurprisingly, this event led to a public backlash against 
Armstrong and many saw this as evidence that he lacked personal integrity.20 More 
interestingly for my purposes, though, is the claim made by some commentators that 
Armstong had not only damaged his own integrity but also that of the sport.  For 
example, Dan Jones of The London Evening Standard commented that Armstrong 
had left cycling, “with about as much basic sporting integrity as the WWE.”21  
 
B. Olympic Badminton 
 
In the 2012 London Olympic Games, four Badminton women’s double pairs were 
disqualified for attempting to deliberately lose a match in order to improve their 
medal prospects. The Badminton World Federation (BWF) took the decision to 
disqualify the pairs because they were guilty of "not using one's best efforts to win," 
and "conducting oneself in a manner that is clearly abusive or detrimental to the 
sport".22 As a result of this decision, the BWF were praised for their “courageous 
decision to protect its sport’s integrity,”23 and awarded The ICSS-Paris 1 Panthéon-
Sorbonne University Trophy for ‘Outstanding Achievement in Promoting Sport 
Integrity’ by The International Center for Sport Security.24  
 
C. Glasgow Rangers 
 
                                                
19 USADA (2012). 
20 Eg. Munro (2013).  
21 Jones (2012). 
22 Badminton World Federation (2013). 
23 Badminton World Federation (2013). 
24 Badminton World Federation (2013). 
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In 2012, the company owning Glasgow Rangers Football Club were placed into 
liquidation and ceased to exist. In their place, a new club, called The Rangers 
Football Club, was established and applied to join the Scottish leagues.25 Historical 
precedent suggested that the new club should have to reapply to enter Scottish 
football in the bottom division. No previous application from a new version of a 
recently defunct club had been successful.26 As the club imploded the other members 
of the league began to realize that the loss of one of Scotland’s best-supported clubs 
from the top league would have negative financial consequences. In light of these 
concerns the proposal was floated that Rangers should be allowed both to avoid 
having to go through a formal application process to re-enter the leagues and to avoid 
having to having to start in the bottom division. Many journalists, chairmen and 
supporters of other clubs criticized these proposals for undermining sporting integrity. 
In fact, some supporters felt so strongly about this issue that they threatened to 
boycott clubs that voted in favour of the proposals.27 The Chairman of Raith Rovers 
Football Club Turnbull Hutton called for the creation of a new governing body, 
“based on sporting integrity”.28 
 
In this section I have presented three cases where sporting integrity is alleged to have 
broken down. In the next section we will investigate what these cases tell us about the 
concept of sporting integrity. Before I begin my argument however, it is worth noting 
                                                
25 It has been suggested by an anonymous referee that the sporting punishment 
Rangers received could be deemed to threaten sporting integrity. Importantly though, 
Rangers did not lose their place in the league as a punishment but rather as a result of 
the company ceasing to exist. The issue of integrity arose when the new club applied 
to join the league and it was suggested that they should be given special treatment. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.  
26 A similar previous attempt had been made after the demise of Gretna Football 
Club. 
27 Keevins (2012). 
28 Halliday (2012). 
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that these three cases present further support for the claim I made in the introduction 
that any acceptable account of sporting integrity should seek to show why it is treated 
as something of great importance. In the Lance Armstrong case, for example, the 
sporting body was keen to point out that they had done their best to maintain the 
integrity of sport. Similarly, in the badminton case the International Centre For 
Sporting Security heralded the actions by the BWF to punish the pairs who had 
deliberately thrown the match. Again this makes sporting integrity look like something 
of significant importance to those with an interest in sport. Likewise, the threat by 
supporters of Scottish Premier League Football teams to boycott matches involving 
clubs who voted in a way they judged to be incompatible with sporting integrity shows 
how important the issue of sporting integrity is to followers of sport. Clearly, then, 
sporting integrity is taken to be of great importance by those involved with sport.  
 
4. Sporting Integrity as a Virtue of Sports 
 
Having looked at three cases where sporting integrity has been called into question I 
am now in a position to assess how best to understand sporting integrity. In Section 
Two I presented three broad options for sporting integrity. Sporting integrity can 
either be understood as a virtue possessed by people involved in sport, by sporting 
institutions or as a virtue of the sport itself. In this section I will argue that it is the last 
option, Sporting Integrity as a Virtue of Sports, that is the best account of how to 
understand sporting integrity. 
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Let’s now turn our attention to which of the three accounts of the possessors of 
sporting integrity laid out in Section One best fits the way in which the phrase is used 
in the case studies.  
 
I shall start by considering Sporting Integrity as Personal Integrity. This view does not 
fit well with all of the ways in which the phrase is used in these three cases. This 
account is most successful in the first case where it seems reasonable to think that 
Armstong compromised his own integrity. However, this does not seem to exhaust the 
ways in which integrity was used in this case, as it was also claimed that Armstrong 
had damaged the integrity of the sport. In the Olympic Badminton case while the 
individuals involved were the subject of personal criticism29, part of this personal 
criticism was that they had threatened the integrity of the sport. Again, in the Rangers 
case, although individuals connected to Rangers were the subjects of media criticism, 
their actions were taken to be a threat not only to their own integrity but also to that 
of the sport.  
 
Sporting Integrity as Institutional Integrity does little better here. At least in the 
majority of these cases, this does not seem to be a plausible interpretation. While in 
the Lance Armstrong case we might well doubt the integrity of the USADA, we could 
accept the USADA’s claim that they did their best to protect the integrity of the sport 
                                                
29 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, it isn’t clear that the actions of the 
individuals was objectionable here. After all, given the set-up of the competition this 
might be viewed as an ingenious strategy for maximizing the chances of success. 
Importantly, my view is compatible both with the view that the players are 
blameworthy and that they are not. We could see the problem as arising only from the 
structure of the competition in which case the players would be blameless. 
Alternatively we could see the problem, as having arisen from a combination of the 
way the tournament was set-up and the attitudes of the players. Either way, the 
problem is that these actions undermined the integrity of the sport. 
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and nevertheless think that sporting integrity has been damaged in some way. The 
Olympic Badminton case is even clearer, at least some observers thought that The 
BWF acted with a level of integrity deserving of an award, yet that the actions of the 
double teams was damaging to the integrity of the sport. Perhaps, in The Rangers 
case it is possible to interpret the criticism as being levelled against the sport’s 
governing body. We might think that the possibility that Rangers might be treated 
differently to other clubs undermines the claim that the governing bodies are acting in 
line with Dworkin’s requirement those enforcing the law should treat the law as 
“expressing and respecting a coherent set of principles.”30 However, this does not 
seem to capture all of the ways in which sporting integrity was seen to be threatened. 
It doesn’t, for example, seem easy to reconcile with Hutton’s claim that a new 
organization needs to be “based on sporting integrity, as this suggests that this is a 
value the institution needs to protect rather than possess.  
 
Rather, the claim in all three cases seems to be that it is the integrity of the sport that is 
damaged. In the Armstrong case Dan Jones claimed that the sport had been left with 
similar levels of integrity as WWE. In the Badminton case the governing bodies were 
praised for protecting the integrity of the sport from the double pairs. In the Rangers 
case there was a call for a new governing body to be based on sporting integrity. All 
this suggests that the possessor of sporting integrity, if it is present, is the sport itself. In 
order to satisfy Respect Ordinary Use it looks like we are committed to giving an account 
of integrity as a virtue of sports. The nine options we examined in Section Two can, 
then, be reduced to three. 
                                                
30 (1986 p.217). 
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We might worry that understanding the possessor of sporting integrity as the sport 
rather than the sportsperson or institution leaves us unable to question the actions of 
individuals or institutions in these cases. This, though, is not the case. This account of 
the possessor of sporting integrity allows us to criticise the individuals and institutions 
in these cases for damaging the integrity of the sport.31 My claim then, is not that the 
individuals or institutions are blameless in these three cases but rather that viewing the 
possessor of sporting integrity as the sport itself allows us to better understand why 
these actions were problematic.    
 
5. A Coherence Account of Sporting Integrity 
 
If we accept that sporting integrity is a virtue of sports then we must now answer the 
second question of what sporting integrity is. In Section Two I claimed that the 
different accounts of integrity as a moral virtue can be grouped into coherence 
accounts, practical identity accounts and social accounts. I will start by considering 
whether any of these three forms of moral integrity provide a helpful starting point.  
 
A. The Social View 
 
The first option to set to one side is the idea that integrity is a social virtue that 
amounts to standing by one’s commitments in front of one’s peers. There are two 
problems with this approach. First, it is far from clear what it could mean for a sport 
to stand by its commitments. It doesn’t seem like a sport is the kind of thing that is 
capable of standing for something. Second, it isn’t clear how we could understand 
                                                
31 We might also want to question the moral integrity of the individuals and institutions 
in these cases.  
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what people, institutions or practices could count as a sport’s peers. It seems hard to 
see how any coherent and persuasive response could be given to these questions and 
for that reason, I will set this option to one side. 
 
B. The Practical Identity View 
 
It is tempting at this stage to think that the practical identity account will fare no 
better. After all, what could it be for a sport, as distinct from a sportsperson or a 
sporting institution, to have a practical identity? A sport is not the kind of thing that 
acts so we might think that this account will fare no better than the previous one.  
This, though, would be too quick. An interesting version of this view is suggested by 
an Oxford Research report into integrity in sport. The report suggests the following 
account of integrity: “Threats to the integrity of sport occur if the people involved 
in or related to sports do not behave in accordance with the values of sport.32 On this 
view sporting integrity is a matter of those involved in sport staying true to the 
principles upon which sport is based. The report then suggests that the principles are 
those of ‘Fair Play’, ‘Comradeship, Team Effort and Hard Work’ and ‘Promoting 
Health’.33 
 
                                                
32 (2010 p.6). 
33 (2010 p.6). It is worth noting that we could not make a similar move to construct a 
plausible social virtue view of integrity. Key to this form of the practical identity view 
is that the identity conferring commitments are held by the sport and sportspeople 
and institutions perform the ‘staying true’ to these commitments. This avoids the 
objection that a sport is incapable of acting while making sense of the claim that it is 
the sport that possesses the integrity. A social virtue view is unable to utilize a similar 
approach. The reason for this is that on this view it is important that someone stand 
by her own commitments in front of other deliberators and a sport is unable to 
perform the act of ‘staying true’. Conversely, if sports people and institutions stay true 
to their own commitments then it is they and not the sport that would be the 
possessors of integrity.  
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This definition certainly does well in satisfying Explain the Connection. As I showed in 
Section Two, one of the approaches to defining moral integrity is to do so in terms of 
staying true to a practical identity. This account of sporting integrity is similar; in both 
accounts possessing integrity is a matter of staying true to identity conferring 
commitments. There is a clear connection then, between this account of sporting 
integrity and other ways in which the word ‘integrity’ is used. 
 
However, there are two ways in which this definition might be challenged. We might 
challenge the claim that when sports men and women act in a way that is contrary to 
these individual values they damage the integrity of the sport. Alternatively we might 
seek to deny that sporting integrity is a matter of staying true to any sporting 
principles.  
 
I will start by raising the first kind of challenge. First, consider the value of ‘Promoting 
Health’. There are, at least, two problems with claiming that sporting integrity 
involves staying true to this value. First, if this were a necessary part of sporting 
integrity then it should be expected that people will criticize sports stars or institutions 
that act in ways that are contrary to this value as damaging sporting integrity. 
However, this does not seem to be what happens. For example, while there was 
widespread public disapproval in the UK when it was announced that companies 
such as Cadburys, McDonalds and Coca-Cola that promote unhealthy food and drink 
products would sponsor the 2012 Olympics. The decision to allow these companies to 
sponsor the games was criticized by the editors of The Lancet as “marring the healthy 
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vision of the games.”34 However, despite this criticism this decision was not seen as 
one that brought the integrity of the sport into question.  
 
Moreover, there are some sports that do not involve a clear link to the promotion of 
health, even amongst the participants. Many, for example, class Formula One and 
Darts as sports yet neither seems to promote the health of the participants. Of course, 
we could simply say that if they are sports then they are not sports with any integrity. 
Again, though, if this were the case then we should expect people to criticize these 
sports as lacking integrity and again this does not seem to happen. At least in respect 
to this value, then, this account fails to satisfy Respect Ordinary Use.  
 
In addition it seems hard to see why a sports person or institution that fails to respect 
this value should render the competition meaningless. While, it is reasonable to 
criticize a violation of this value, doing so appears to be perfectly compatible with 
continuing to take the competition seriously. This means that this account also fails to 
satisfy Justify Importance. 
 
The values of ‘Comradeship, Team Effort and Hard Work’ are also problematic, as 
there seem to be cases of sports stars who lack these traits without damaging the 
sport’s integrity. Take comradeship and team effort. While it might be true that these 
are essential values for many sports the case is less clear for individual sports such as 
sprinting, tennis (singles) or the high jump. Of course, a modern athlete would not get 
very far without working alongside a committed team of coaches and support staff.  
 
                                                
34 (2012). 
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However, it seems unlikely that people would think that if a world champion sprinter 
were to possess none of these virtues then this would damage the integrity of the sport. 
Nor is hard work a sporting virtue that appears relevant to integrity. While it is true 
that sports stars who work hard to earn their achievements are often admired, it is also 
the case that sometimes sportsmen and women are admired for possessing seemingly 
effortless talents. What is remarkable about watching Usain Bolt sprinting or Zinedine 
Zidane play a sixty-yard pass is that they make it look as if this ability comes naturally. 
Of course, it could be that what we are admiring is the hard work required to achieve 
such a high level of skill that these tasks can be executed effortlessly. However, this 
doesn’t seem quite right. We would still marvel at these talents even if we found out 
that Bolt and Zidane never do any training. Perhaps we would find these talents even 
more marvellous if this were the case. Certainly, it would seem odd to think of this as 
undermining the integrity of sprinting or football. Respect for this value seems no 
more likely to satisfy Respect Ordinary Use than ‘Promoting Health’. Nor does it seem 
any more likely to satisfy Justify Importance. While the values of Comradeship, Team 
Effort and Hard Work all seem to be worthy of respect there is little reason to think 
that a failure of participants to adhere to these values would render a sporting 
competition meaningless.  
 
The final value, fair play, does appear to be better placed to satisfy both of these 
desiderata. The report claims that fair play involves following rules, everyone 
competing under the same conditions and having an equal opportunity to win.35 All 
three case studies are plausibly seen as failures of fairness. Armstrong didn’t follow the 
rules, while the badminton doubles teams gave some of their opponents a greater 
                                                
35 (2010 p.6). 
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chance of winning than others. Finally, the possibility of Glasgow Rangers being given 
special treatment is a clear case of the authorities giving one team more of a chance to 
be successful than other teams. Moreover, there also seems good reason to think that 
this value is important. A competition that gives one team an unfair advantage over 
another might well be thought of as meaningless.  
 
Nevertheless there are problems with this account. The first problem is that it doesn’t 
seem as if what matters for sporting integrity is whether someone or some institution 
acts in an unfair way but whether they are able to get away with it. If Lance 
Armstrong had failed a drugs test on the very first race in which he took the banned 
substances then it is unlikely that anyone would have complained about damages to 
sporting integrity. More generally, people break rules in sport all the time; that is why 
there are fouls, red cards, sin bins and suspensions. This only becomes an issue for 
sporting integrity when people are able to break rules and get away with it. If this 
account of sporting integrity were an accurate reflection of ordinary use then we 
would expect people to raise the issue of sporting integrity whenever sports people act 
in a way that is unfair. Given that this is not the case we can conclude that this 
account does not satisfy Respect Ordinary Use. 
 
Moreover, on further inspection this view does not give a satisfactory account of the 
importance of sporting integrity either. While it is right to worry about a sport where 
people are able to get away with breaking the rules there seems little reason to worry 
about a sport where people sometimes break the rules. Imagine a competition in 
which competitors frequently break the rules but are always caught and given the 
appropriate punishment. This competition does seem to be one it would be 
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reasonable to be interested in. Much more so, certainly, than a competition in which 
rule violations are rare but never punished. If this is right then it seems as if the kind of 
problem that might make competition meaningless is not when those involved act in 
an unfair way but when unfairness goes unpunished. In this respect, then, this account 
does not satisfy Justify Importance. 
 
So far I have claimed that it does not seem plausible to think that sporting integrity is 
a matter of those involved in sport or sporting institutions staying true to any of the 
three values offered by The Oxford Research Report. Of course, someone 
sympathetic to this approach to defining sporting integrity might respond by offering 
alternative values to take the place of these three. However, there are two problems 
with this. First, it seems likely that if any values are to be identity conferring for sport 
then it would be these three. It is hard to see then what alternative values a supporter 
of this approach could offer in place of these three. More importantly, though, is that 
it just does not seem right to say that unless a sport is committed to some fundamental 
values it is not worth watching. At the very least the supporter of this account owes us 
an explanation as to why we should take sporting integrity so seriously on this 
account. To be fair to the writers of the report, they seem to place less stress on this 
aspect of sporting integrity, saying only that if a sport loses its integrity it “might lose 
its appeal.”36Nevertheless, I take it that there is good reason by this stage in the 
discussion to want an account of sporting integrity to do more than show this level of 
importance. Ideally, an account should explain why competition would be 
meaningless in its absence.  
 
                                                
36 (2010 p.6). 
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C. The Coherence View 
 
This leaves us with one other option, a coherence account of sporting integrity. In the 
rest of this section I will present an account of sporting integrity as coherence that 
satisfies all of the desiderata that I have claimed should be looked for in an account of 
sporting integrity.   
 
The starting point of my account will be to look at what sport is. The orthodox answer 
amongst philosophers of sport is the answer offered by Bernard Suits’ in The 
Grasshopper (2005). Suits claims that sports are a subclass of games that involve physical 
skill, exertion, prowess etc. Suits defines playing a game in the following way:  
 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory 
goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules 
prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive 
rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make possible such 
activity [lusory attitude].37 
 
For example, when I play football I have a pre-game goal (score more goals than the 
opposition) and we accept constraints on how we can achieve this goal (the rules of 
football). These constraints make achieving the goal harder than it otherwise would be 
and I accept them because they make the game of football possible.  
 
                                                
37 (2005 pp.54-55). 
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This definition of sport points towards a plausible coherence account of sporting 
integrity. If sport involves achieving a specific state of affairs through the use of less 
efficient means then it seems plausible to think that a coherent sport will be one in 
which the contestants face the same constraints in the means they can use to achieve 
this state of affairs. My account of sporting integrity, then, is as follows: 
 
Coherence Account of Sporting Integrity: A sport has integrity to the extent that the 
constraints that the competitors face in the means they can use to achieve a 
given end are coherent.  
 
This account of sporting integrity fits with the way it was used in our three case 
studies.  
 
This is most obvious in the Armstrong case, where the US cycling team faced a very 
different set of inefficiencies to those faced by the other teams, as their riders were 
taking performance-enhancing drugs. This problem with this incoherence can be 
clearly seen from the Suitsian account of sport, as one of the rules that constitute the 
sport of cycling is that competitors may not take certain performance enhancing 
drugs. In this case then, the constraints faced by some competitors did not cohere with 
the constraints facing other riders. In breaking these rules, the US cycling team 
created a situation in which the constraints facing other contestants did not cohere 
with the constraints they were facing.38  
 
                                                
38 An interesting related question concerns whether those who break the rules of a 
sport can be said to be playing the sport. For a discussion of this issue see Feezell 
(1988) and Suits (2005 p. 59).  
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In response to this diagnosis of the Armstrong it could be argued that other riders 
were also taking performance-enhancing drugs and so there was coherence in the 
constraints each faced.39 However, if we accept this claim then another form of 
incoherence emerges. Namely, an incoherence between the constraints the athletes 
claim to accept and those they actually accept. This Suitsian analysis of games seems 
unable able to explain the problem with this incoherence. After all, from the point of 
view of the competitors we might think that it does not matter what constraints people 
claim to face, so long as each the constraints they actually face are the same. 
However, from the point of view of the spectators this lack of coherence is important. 
Spectators want to be in a position to evaluate the various performances of the 
competitors. An important source of pleasure in watching sport is in analyzing the 
performances of the various competitors. One way of accounting for this important 
part of spectatorship is given by Stephen Mumford. He claims that sport is a “contest 
of virtue,” that, “allows us to learn about and understand morality better.”40 Clearly if 
we accept this view then evaluating the performances of the competitors will be 
important in order to properly identify the virtues being displayed. Even if we don’t 
accept Mumford’s view though, one need only listen to the debates that take place in 
sport sections of newspapers and sports phone-in radio shows to see that evaluating 
the performances of the competitors is an important part of sport spectatorship. The 
importance of this element of spectatorship shows the problem that would arise from 
an incoherence between the constraints the athletes claim to accept and those they 
actually accept. In such a situation spectators would be unable to accurately evaluate 
the performances of athletes, as they would not know what constraints the athletes 
                                                
39 Thanks to John William Devine for raising this issue.  
40 (2012 p. 98).  
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face. This shows that a lack of coherence between Suitsian constitutive rules is only 
one of the ways in which a sport might be incoherent and lack integrity.  
 
The Coherence Account also allows us to see what was problematic in the Rangers 
case. Allowing Rangers to start out in the top league would have led to one team 
facing a different set of constraints to other teams. Unlike with the Armstrong case, 
this would not have been an incoherence in constitutive rules (the rules that create and 
define the sport of cycling) but an incoherence in the regulative rules (the rules that 
regulate the existing sport).41 There is still though, an incoherence in the constraints 
that different competitors would face, as while other teams would have had to win 
several leagues to earn the right to compete in the top league, Rangers would not have 
done. The Coherence Account then, allows us to explain why this case was seen as a 
threat to sporting integrity.  
 
We might think that The Coherence Account will be less effective in handling The 
Olympic Badminton Case, as there are no rules (constitutive or regulative) that can be 
said to provide greater constraints to one team than another in this case. However, 
this account can explain why this should count as a breach of sporting integrity, as the 
coherence of the constraints facing different opponents can be threatened even when 
no rules are being broken. In this case the opponents of the pairs that were 
deliberately trying to lose their matches were facing very different constraints to pairs 
who were playing opponents trying to win their matches. The competition then, is not 
one in which competitors face a coherent set of constraints. The Coherence Account 
                                                
41 The distinction between these two kinds of rule comes from Searle (1969 p.33).  
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is able to explain why all three of the cases we have looked at are breaches of sporting 
integrity. This shows that it does a good job of satisfying Respect Ordinary Use. 
 
This account is also able to satisfy Justify Importance. A sport where one team faces far 
greater constraints than their opponents is of little interest. The reason why is that 
such a competition would both be unfair and would fail to determine winners on the 
basis of sporting ability. Who cares that Lance Armstrong managed to win the Tour 
De France while taking performance-enhancing drugs? This is not an interesting or 
worthwhile achievement. Similarly, there is little reason to care about how far a 
badminton team progresses through a tournament when it is doing so as a result of 
playing a team that are deliberately losing their games. Finally, there is no reason to 
be interested in the fact that a newly created football club have managed to reach the 
second tier of a national competition when they have not had to face the obstacles 
that other clubs would have had to face to get there. In all these cases these ‘victories’ 
fail to count as legitimate sporting achievements, as they were not gained as a result of 
winning a competition in which competitors faced a coherent set of constraints.  
 
Finally, this account also satisfies Explain the Connection. Firstly because coherence is 
often seen as offering a plausible account of personal or institutional integrity and so 
this account is extending these approaches to sporting integrity. Secondly, because this 
account is true to the etymology of the term. A coherence account of integrity is one 
where the inefficiencies that one competitor faces in order to make sporting 
competition possible apply to all of the other competitors. This then is a case of these 
inefficiencies ranging across the complete range of competitors. None of the 
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competitors are excluded from these constraints; they apply to the whole range of 
competitors.  
6. Objection and Response 
One objection that might be raised against my argument is that it rests on a flawed 
methodology.42 I have been interested in investigating how sporting integrity by 
looking at three of the highest profile case where sporting integrity has been called 
into question. It could be claimed though that this leaves open the possibility that in 
other situations the phrase is used to refer to different concepts, perhaps one possessed 
by individuals or institutions. If this is the case then it might be thought that I have 
failed to provide an adequate defence of the claim that sporting integrity must be 
understood in the way I present.  
 
It is worth pointing out that at worst this objection requires a weakening of the claim I 
have been defending. If this objection is right then instead of saying that The 
Coherence Account of Sporting Integrity as A Virtue of Sports is the most plausible 
way to understand sporting integrity I would only be entitled to say that it is the most 
plausible way to understand one form of sporting integrity. This is an interesting claim 
in itself but it is worth pointing out that as it stands there is no reason to retreat to this 
weaker claim. Of course it is possible that we use sporting integrity in other ways but 
until we are presented with a case where it is used to refer to a different concept then 
we have no reason to accept that there are a variety of forms of sporting integrity.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have argued first that sporting integrity should be viewed as a virtue 
possessed by sports rather than by sporting competitors or institutions. I then 
                                                
42 Thanks to Eman Hurych for raising this objection. 
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defended a coherence view of this virtue. According to this view sporting integrity is a 
matter of coherence in the inefficiencies that people accept in order to make sporting 
competition possible. A sport in which people face very different constraints is one 
that lacks integrity. I argued that this view does a better job of satisfying the desiderata 
that a plausible view of sporting integrity should satisfy.  
 
Before I finish it is worth mentioning an interesting consequence that this account has 
for those concerned with protect sporting integrity. According to this account of 
sporting integrity, sporting integrity is not a virtue possessed by either sporting 
competitors or sporting institutions. This suggests that the task of upholding sporting 
integrity may not be the sole responsibility of either the competitors or the institutions. 
Rather it may be up to both competitors and institutions to ensure that the integrity of 
sport is preserved. A full defence of this view, however, must wait for another day.43   
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